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A NUMBER of judicial decisions during the survey period affected
the law of partnerships and corporations in Texas. The most sig-
nificant of these recent developments occurred in the area of secur-
ities regulation. These decisions and developments are canvassed below.
I. PARTNERSHIPS
Formation. In one of the most unusual cases to arise during the survey
year, the primary issue was whether two women who had been involved in
a long-term lesbian relationship had formed a partnership. In Small v.
HarperI Jo Ann Small brought suit against her former lover, Aldean
Harper, to recover a share of the property that the parties had acquired
during their twelve- to fifteen-year relationship. Included in the property
was a single family dwelling, title to which was in Harper's name alone.
Small contended that she and Harper had formed a partnership by orally
agreeing to commingle their assets, to invest in real estate and other prop-
erty, and to share any profits. In the alternative, she alleged that she and
Harper had entered into a series of joint ventures.
Harper moved for summary judgment. The only evidence she offered in
support of her motion were portions of Small's sworn deposition in which
Small repeatedly characterized her relationship with Harper in terms of
marriage 2 and admitted that the women had no agreement concerning the
contribution of assets to the claimed partnership for profit.3 Solely on the
basis of the deposition testimony the trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Harper.
On appeal the court considered significant Small's testimony that the
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1. 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston lIst Dist.] 1982, no writ).
2. In her testimony, Small characterized her relationship with Harper as a "marriage-
type relationship" and as a "marriage" and depicted the parties as doing "all of the things
that a married couple would do." Id at 26-27 (emphasis deleted).
3. Id
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parties had agreed to invest together.4 The court also found that the depo-
sition testimony as a whole raised a number of factual issues concerning
the couple's business affairs, including whether the women had combined
funds to invest in stocks with the expectation of jointly sharing the pro-
ceeds, whether they had pooled their assets to purchase other property, and
whether they had commingled their incomes in order to achieve monetary
gains.5 Furthermore, the court found no public policy that would preclude
Small, as a lesbian, from recovering against Harper based on a partnership
or on a series of joint ventures.6 The court therefore held that summary
judgment was improper and remanded for a new trial.7
Although Small will now have the opportunity to prove that she and
Harper did form a partnership, her deposition testimony strongly suggests
that the women were not carrying on as co-owners a business for profit.8
Insofar as Small is seeking a share in what is presumably the couple's resi-
dence and insofar as her claim is predicated on a marriage-type relation-
ship, Small appears to be demanding an equitable settlement of the
couple's joint property under the guise of a partnership claim. 9
Fiduciary Duty. The scope of the fiduciary duty of a joint venturer to his
co-venturers was at issue in Sanchez v. Matthews.10 Andrew Sanchez, Jr.,
James 0. Matthews, and a third party formed a joint venture to sell a
parcel of land. The parties deeded legal title to the land to Sanchez who
was to actively manage the property. When the joint venturers were un-
able to sell the land at a profit, they decided to sell it at a price that would
return to them only their initial cost and expenses. Sanchez obtained from
a buyer an earnest money contract on the property, and the three co-ven-
turers divided $15,000 as the total net profit on their investment. Shortly
afterwards, without informing his co-venturers, Sanchez arranged to ac-
quire from the buyer the same percentage interest in the land that he held
in the joint venture. The repurchase was concluded soon after the prop-
erty was conveyed to the buyer. When the buyer resold the property two
years later, Sanchez received more than $150,000 as net profit from his
interest in the land.
4. Id. at 27.
5. Id
6. Id at 28. The court gleaned the state's public policy on this subject primarily from
Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 116 S.W. 43 (1909), in which the Texas Supreme Court
held that the question of whether a woman who had married a bigamist had rights in real
property was a question of fact to be submitted to the jury. Id. at 314, 116 S.W. at 46. The
court also noted a case recognizing an express trust in favor of a woman who had lived with
a man without the benefit of marriage. See Cluck v. Sheets, 141 Tex. 219, 171 S.W.2d 860
(1943).
7. 638 S.W.2d at 30.
8. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6 (Vernon 1970) defines a partnership as
"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
9. The California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106,
134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), recognized that a partnership was distinct from other types of
arrangements that a pair-bonded couple could enter into. Id at 674 n. 10, 557 P.2d at 116
n.10, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825 n.10.
10. 636 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ retd n.r.e.).
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Matthews brought suit against Sanchez alleging a breach of fiduciary
duty arising from the joint venture. Finding that Sanchez had breached
his fiduciary duty to Matthews, the trial court imposed a constructive trust
on the profits Sanchez had derived from the resale of the joint venture
property. On appeal Sanchez contended that the joint venture had termi-
nated before he repurchased an interest in the land, and that he therefore
owed no fiduciary duty to Matthews. The court of appeals examined four
Texas Supreme Court decisions" and concluded that the supreme court
has "limited the scope of a joint venture for the purpose of imposing a
constructive trust."' 2 Nevertheless, the court found that Sanchez's fiduci-
ary duty to Matthews did not terminate when Sanchez sold the property on
behalf of the joint venture.' 3 Because the original agreement embraced
the interest Sanchez received in this subsequent deal, the court held that a
constructive trust was properly imposed on his profits from the resale. 14
Although the court reached a sensible result in this case, the court mis-
construed Texas Supreme Court precedent. The court in Sanchez cited
Huffinglon v. Upchurch 15 as direct support for the proposition that the
supreme court has limited the fiduciary responsibilities arising from a joint
venture; yet, the court in Huffington imposed a constructive trust, empha-
sizing the extraordinary fiduciary duty that a managing partner owes to his
co-partners.' 6 Neither Huffinglon nor any of the other decisions the court
cited in Sanchez suggests that the supreme court has adopted a generally
restrictive view of joint ventures for the purpose of imposing a constructive
trust. 17
Rights of Partners. Two cases during the survey period concerned a part-
ner's alleged conversion of partnership assets. In Pignataro v. Russo 18 the
11. These decisions are Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977); Huffington v.
Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1976); Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. v. Thompson, 405
S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1966); and Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367, 341 S.W.2d 401 (1960).
12. 636 S.W.2d at 459.
13. Id
14. Id
15. 532 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1976).
16. Id. at 579 (citing Smith v. Bolin, 153 Tex. 486, 492, 271 S.W.2d 93, 96 (1954), which
in turn cited Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928)). Although joint ven-
turers are not technically partners, Sanchez, 636 S.W.2d at 459 (citing G. & G. BOGERT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 488 (rev. 2d ed. 1978)), cases involving partnership princi-
les are routinely cited in cases involving joint ventures. See, e.g., Hackney v. Johnson, 601
.W.2d 523, 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ ref'd. n.r.e.) (citing Colonial Refriger-
ated Transp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 1968); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG,
LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS § 35, at 189 (1968)).
17. The Texas Supreme Court in Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977), did
indicate that it would not impose a constructive trust on profits derived by an individual
venturer from an independent enterprise that the original joint venture agreement did not
embrace. Id at 944. The reasoning of Rankin, however, has no application when a venturer
sells for his individual profit the very property that is the subject of the original joint ven-
ture, see Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367, 341 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1960), Sanchez, 636
S.W.2d at 459, or where the joint venture agreement is drafted to extend to other enterprises.
See Hufflngton, 532 S.W.2d at 578 (agreement indicated that scope of venture was to extend
to all mineral interests acquired by any of the parties).
18. 633 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
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court held that a partner who used partnership assets to continue the busi-
ness after dissolution was not liable in conversion to a retiring partner who
had elected to receive the value of his interest at the time of dissolution
under section 42 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act. 19 The court rea-
soned that section 42 "envisions the continuation of business operations
employing partnership assets and compensates the partner who leaves
... . Because of that compensation and the purpose of § 42, the use of
partnership assets after dissolution cannot be viewed as conversion. '20
Under other circumstances, however, a partner may be held liable in
conversion. In Shannon v. Monasco21 the court found that the parties' di-
vision of the partnership assets among themselves terminated the partner-
ship and the defendants' right to exercise control over those assets. 22 The
court consequently found the defendants liable in conversion for seizing
former partnership property that had been distributed to the plaintiffs. 23
II. CORPORATIONS
Piercing the Corporate Veil Hickman v. Raws 24 exemplifies the reluctance
of Texas courts to pierce the corporate veil and impose alter ego liability
on corporate shareholders and directors for contractual obligations of the
corporation. In Hickman two architects sought to recover from corporate
shareholders for plans the architects had prepared pursuant to a contract
with the corporation. In light of evidence that the corporation had been
unable to pay for the architectural services when the parties executed the
contract, that the corporation had forfeited its corporate charter for failure
to pay franchise taxes, and that it had not observed the requisite corporate
formalities,25 the trial court held the shareholders liable for the corporate
debt. The court of appeals reversed, refusing to pierce the corporate veil in
the absence of "extraordinary circumstances where the corporate entity is
used to perpetrate a fraud against the public."' 26 The court of appeals
found that the corporation had been organized for a legitimate purpose,
but had failed for economic reasons beyond the control of the individual
shareholders. 27 Moreover, since the plaintiffs had had the opportunity to
investigate the corporation's financial status before entering into the con-
tract, the court concluded they could not complain when the corporation
19. Id at 573; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 42 (Vernon 1970).
20. 633 S.W.2d at 573 (citing Ogle v. Craig, 456 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1970), modified, 464 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1971)).
21. 632 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
22. Id at 948.
23. Id at 949.
24. 638 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
25. The corporation had held only one board of directors' meeting and one sharehold-
ers' meeting during its existence; it had failed to open a checking account and make loans,
although both actions had been authorized by the bylaws and by corporate resolution; stock
certificates had never been filled out; and no financial records had been maintained.
26. Id at 102; see also Torregrossa v. Szelc, 603 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1980) (court will not
pierce corporate veil absent evidence that corporate form is being used as a sham).
27. 630 S.W.2d at 102.
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was unable to meet its obligations. 28
A plaintiffs ability to recover based on alter ego liability may depend on
his pleadings. In Pederson v. Dillon29 the plaintiff sued the officers of a
corporation for tortious interference with a contract that the plaintiff had
made with the corporation. The court found little, if any, evidence that
either of the corporate officers had participated in his individual capacity
in any of the alleged acts of interference; thus, only the alter ego theory of
liability could have supported a judgment against the individual defend-
ants.30 The court held, however, that the plaintiffs failure to plead the
alter ego theory in a timely fashion precluded him from recovering against
either of the individual defendants on that ground. 31
One who has chosen to do business in the corporate form may occasion-
ally benefit from arguing that the corporate entity should be disregarded,
but courts are generally unsympathetic to that view. 32 In McDonald v.
Bennett33 the Fifth Circuit dealt with the issues of whether, and to what
extent, an individual could recover for damages suffered by the corpora-
tion of which he was the sole shareholder. By misrepresenting the
financial condition of Englewood Industries, two of its three shareholders
induced Charles McDonald to invest in Englewood. McDonald was the
sole shareholder of Sealy International Technical Corporation (SITCO).
To bolster Englewood's financial position McDonald arranged for SITCO
to obtain a loan, the proceeds of which SITCO used to purchase Engle-
wood's assets, to pay off Englewood's creditors, and to purchase Engle-
wood stock for McDonald. Despite these and other efforts by McDonald
to rescue Englewood, Englewood was forced into bankruptcy, and Mc-
Donald ultimately lost his investment.
After a jury trial the district court awarded McDonald his out-of-pocket
losses as well as all sums SITCO had expended as a consequence of the
fraud. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit the defendant contended that all of
the money spent and lost by SITCO properly belonged to SITCO, 34 and
not to McDonald. McDonald rejoined that he had properly recovered for
SITCO's losses under the rule of Heinrichs v. Evins Personnel Consultants,
Inc. ,35 in which a defrauded individual was permitted to recover sums his
closely held corporation paid to purchase a franchise on his behalf.36
The Fifth Circuit did not fully agree with either party. It found McDon-
28. Id
29. 623 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1981, no writ).
30. Id at 697.
31. Id
32. See, e.g., Delta Pipe Fabricators, Inc. v. Bullock, 638 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Ct. App.-
Austin 1982, no writ) (parent corporation seeking to avoid imposition of excise and sales
taxes on its wholly owned subsidiary).
33. 674 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1982).
34. The defendant argued in the alternative that the damages belonged to Energy
Building Systems Corporation (EBSCO), a corporation into which MacDonald merged
SITCO between the time he had purchased an interest in Englewood and the time of trial.
McDonald owned 70% of the stock of EBSCO.
35. 486 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1972).
36. Id at 936.
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ald's reliance on Heinrichs misplaced: in Heinrichs only the check drawn
on the corporation linked the corporation with the purchased franchise,
whereas in this case SITCO was clearly involved with Englewood.37 Reit-
erating the Texas position that a shareholder cannot recover as an individ-
ual on a cause of action vested in the corporation, even if he owns all or
substantially all of the corporation's capital stock, 38 the court concluded
that only SITCO was entitled to recover the corporation's losses. 39 The
court, however, did permit McDonald to recover the money that SITCO
had paid to purchase the Englewood stock for him under an exception that
allows a shareholder to recover expenditures made by a corporation on the
shareholder's behalf.4° Thus, consistent with Heinrichs, the court allowed
McDonald to recover the value SITCO paid for McDonald's benefit but
refused to let him personally reclaim the sums expended by SITCO on its
own behalf.4'
Finally, the alter ego doctrine was raised as a defense to criminal liabil-
ity in Weaver v. State.42 Weaver represented to persons who bought de-
bentures from him that he would use the proceeds of the sales to
commence the operations of Can of Worms, Inc., a business venture
formed to market cans of worms as novelty items. The purchasers of the
debentures sued Weaver for violating the securities laws, alleging that
Weaver intended to use the proceeds to pay off creditors of Worm Enter-
prises, a company from which Can of Worms, Inc. was contractually obli-
gated to buy its worms, and of which Weaver was an investor-member.
Weaver contended as a defense that Can of Worms, Inc. and Worm Enter-
prises were alter egos, presumably to prove that he had not diverted assets
from Can of Worms, Inc. The court found Weaver's use of the alter ego
doctrine unavailing, asserting that the doctrine, being remedial in nature,
is a means of piercing the corporate veil to hold individuals personally
liable in certain actions and is not available as a defense.43
Parent Liability for Subsidiary. Courts are often more willing to allow
plaintiff's to recovery on the alter ego theory against a parent corporation
that uses a subsidiary to insulate itself from liability than against an indi-
vidual who is using a closely held corporation for a similar purpose. Texas
Industries, Inc. v. Lucas" illustrates this point. Randall Lucas had been
37. 674 F.2d at 1085. As evidence of SITCO's involvement with Englewood, the court
cited the sale-leaseback arrangement between the two corporations pertaining to Engle-
wood's assets; SITCO's pledging Englewood's assets as collateral in connection with two
separate loans; and a loan proposal that repeatedly referred to a new corporation formed to
manufacture polyurethane panels as "EBSCO/Englewood." Id
38. Id. (quoting Stinnett v. Paramount-Famous Lasky Corp., 37 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved)).
39. 674 F.2d at 1085.
40. Id at 1086 (citing Cullum v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 115 S.W.2d 1196,
1201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, no writ).
41. 674 F.2d at 1087.
42. 638 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
43. Id at 513 (citing Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
writ refd n.r.e.)).
44. 634 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ granted).
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injured by a beam manufactured by TXI Structural Products, Inc. (Struc-
tural). Lucas brought suit against Texas Industries, Inc. (TII), Structural's
parent corporation, to recover for his injuries, and after a jury trial, was
awarded damages against TI. On appeal the question facing the court
was whether TII was so closely identified with Structural that it would be
equitable to hold TII liable for Structural's actions. The court looked for
guidance to a noted law review article 45 that had been favorably cited by
the Texas Supreme Court46 and abstracted from it fourteen considerations
relevant to the determination of whether a parent corporation is liable for
the acts of its subsidiary. Because these considerations are instructive, they
are set out here in full:
(1) stock ownership; (2) degree to which the subsidiary is financed
by the parent; (3) the method of such financing; (4) the extent to which
there is a common directorate; (5) the extent to which there are com-
mon officers and employees; (6) the extent to which separate meetings
of stockholders and directors are held; (7) the extent to which both
,.have common departments of business; (8) the degree to which con-
tracts between the two are favorable to one rather than the other;
(9) the extent to which separate books and accounts are kept; (10) the
extent to which an officer or director of one is permitted to determine
the policies of the other; (11) the extent to which an employee, officer,
or director of the parent is casually [sic] connected with the tort or
contract on which the suit is brought; (12) the type of business of each;
(13) the extent to which the trade or public generally regards the two
units as one business unit; (14) whom the contract claimant regards as
the promisor.47
Applying these considerations to the facts, the court found sufficient evi-
dence to uphold the jury's finding that TII was Structural's alter ego. 48 TII
owned all of Structural's stock and financed all of Structural's operating
capital. The two companies had many of the same officers, filed consoli-
dated tax returns and used the same logo. Furthermore, Structural's busi-
ness derived exclusively from contracts entered into by TII. In this regard
the court found it particularly important that the contract to manufacture
the beam that had caused the plaintiffs injuries had been addressed to TII
but signed by an employee of Structural under the name "Texas Indus-
tries, Inc."'49 In light of this evidence the court affirmed the judgment
against TII.50
The court, in passing, offered some advice to parent corporations wish-
ing to avoid alter ego liability. The parent should form a separate, ade-
45. See Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations,
39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929).
46. See Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975); see also 19 R. HAMIL-
TON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 234, at 236-37 (Texas Practice 1973) (setting forth stan-
dards to follow to maintain the distinction between parent and subsidiary).
47. 634 S.W.2d at 752-53.
48. Id at 753.
49. Id The court also found that TII dictated Structural's safety policies and that TI
had no business other than doing business through its subsidiaries. Id
50. Id.
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quately capitalized financial unit for the subsidiary and keep separate the
day-to-day business and the management structures of the two compa-
nies." In addition, the parent should ensure that persons doing business
with either company are aware that the companies are distinct entities5 2
Presumably a parent corporation that follows the court's advice will fare
better than TII did in Lucas.
Usury. Usury laws impose a ceiling on the interest rate that a lender may
charge an individual borrower.5 3 The extent to which a lender can require
an individual to incorporate in order to avoid this ceiling54 was the subject
of Shook v. Republic NationalBank."5 On July 30, 1974, John Shook exe-
cuted a personal note payable to Republic National Bank in the amount of
$698,500 to renew his existing indebtedness to Republic. Republic had
previously informed Shook that, after the July 30th note came due, it
would be unable to extend him further credit at the interest rate it could
lawfully charge him as an individual.5 6 When the note came due on Au-
gust 30, 1974, Shook executed a $698,500 note payable to Republic on be-
half of J.L.S., Inc.,57 a Texas corporation Shook had formed on July 22,
1974. The corporate note bore interest at a rate in excess of the maximum
rate Republic could lawfully charge an individual. Shook subsequently
sought recovery of twice the interest he had paid on the corporation's
note,58 alleging that J.L.S., Inc. was formed in order to evade Texas usury
laws.
In assessing Shook's claim the court noted that a lender could require a
borrower to incorporate even though the purpose of incorporation was to
allow the lender to charge the higher corporate rate of interest so long as
the corporation was not solely used to disguise a usurious loan to an indi-
vidual.5 9 Looking to the substance of the transaction, the court concluded
that the J.L.S., Inc. loan was usurious. 60 The court found critically signifi-
cant the fact that J.L.S., Inc. had no business purpose for the loan; it ob-
tained the loan only to refinance Shook's existing indebtedness to
51. Id at 752-53 (citing Douglas & Shanks, supra note 45).
52. Id 753 (citing Douglas & Shanks, supra note 45).
53. Unless otherwise provided by statute, see infra note 56, the maximum rate of inter-
est that may be charged to an individual is 10% per annum. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971).
54. A corporation may agree to pay up to I A% per month on loans in excess of $5,000,
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon 1980), or an alternative rate of interest
that does not exceed the rates authorized in art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Id
art. 1302-2.09A (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1982-1983).
55. 627 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, writ granted).
56. As a national bank, Republic at that time could have lawfully charged Shook a
maximum interest rate equal to the higher of the rate allowable under Texas law or one
percent in excess of the discount rate on 90-day commercial paper in effect at the Dallas
Federal Reserve Bank. Id. at 745 n.l (citing 12 U.S.C.A. § 85 (West Supp. 1980)).
57. Shook personally guaranteed the corporation's note.
58. See Interest-Consumer Credit and Consumer Protection Act, 1967 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 274, § 2, at 610, amended by Act of May 24, 1979, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 281,
§ 1, at 604-05.
59. 627 S.W.2d at 746-47.
60. Id at 747-48.
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Republic. 6' The court also found that J.L.S., Inc. was a shell corporation
with no business activity, no income, no shareholders' or directors' meet-
ings, and no employees. 62 The court accordingly held that Shook was
entitled to recover the usurious interest.63 This case has generated consid-
erable interest within the Texas banking community,64 and the Texas
Supreme Court has granted a writ of error on the case.65
Shareholders' Agreements. In Tashnek v. Tashnek66 members of the same
family owned three corporations that were primarily engaged in real estate
investments. Friction among the shareholders prompted them to enter
into a written agreement to consolidate the corporations' assets in one cor-
poration and to liquidate the assets of the successor corporation. The
agreement provided in part that:
As of the close of business on February 2, 1976, each Shareholders
[sic] agree [sic), warrants, represents, and does hereby authorize and
instruct the proper officers of R-L-D Properties, Inc. to distribute as a
final distribution in liquidation all remaining assets in the hands of
the Corporation, including any cash, real and personal property as
follows. .... 67
When the distribution of the corporate assets was delayed from February
2, 1976, until November 1976, the minority shareholders sued the control-
ling shareholders, who were also directors of the corporation, for breach of
the agreement. Acknowledging that the agreement might not bind a direc-
tor of a corporation in his capacity as a director, the court concluded that
this fact would not affect the defendants' liability as shareholders for
breaching the obligations they had assumed pursuant to the terms of the
shareholder agreement. 68 The court also found that the nonbreaching
shareholders were not required to bring a derivative suit because the fail-
ure to distribute the assets in a timely manner constituted a wrong against
them as shareholders and individuals, as well as a wrong against the cor-
poration. 69 The court, therefore, affirmed the award of compensatory
damages to the plaintiffs.70
61. Id. at 747.
62. Id at 748.
63. Id at 752. The court also rejected the bank's argument that Shook waived or
should be estopped from asserting his usury claim because he was a lawyer. The court
followed the general rule that waiver and estoppel are not defenses to a usury cause of
action. Id at 751.
64. See TEX. BANK LAW., June 1982, at 1; Crump, Shook Y. Republic Bank: Another
View, TEX. BANK LAW., Aug. 1982, at 3.
65. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 449 (July 24, 1982). After this Article went to press, the Texas
Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that the loan involved was not usurious.
26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 365, 368 (May 4, 1983).
66. 630 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1981, no writ).
67. Id at 655.
68. Id. at 656.
69. Id. (citing Stinnett v. Paramount-Famous Lasky Corp., 37 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved)).
70. 630 S.W.2d at 656.
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De Facto Merger. Despite the Texas Legislature's recent attempt to bar
product liability claims against one corporation that has acquired the as-
sets of another absent the acquiring corporation's express assumption of
such liability,7' the de facto merger doctrine may not yet be moribund with
respect to claims arising before the effective date of article 5.10B.72 In
Castilla v. Trinity Industries, Inc. 73 Jose Luis Castilla brought suit against
Custom Tool and Machine Company and Trinity Industries, Inc. for inju-
ries he had suffered while performing maintenance work on a rotary kiln
manufactured and sold by Custom. Trinity acquired Custom's assets after
the kiln was sold but before the accident occurred. Trinity did not ex-
pressly assume liability for product liability claims that might be brought
against Custom. Observing that the facts of this case arose before the ef-
fective date of article 5. lOB,74 the court suggested that Castilla might have
succeeded in proving a cause of action against Trinity75 had he shown that
a de facto merger had resulted from Trinity's acquisition of Custom's as-
sets.76 The court, however, found no evidence that Trinity was the succes-
sor corporation to Custom. 77 As the concurring justice pointed out, no
officer or director of Custom had become an officer or director of Trinity,
and the product line in question had been discontinued.78
Corporate Agents. Although it is elementary that one who signs a docu-
ment on behalf of a corporation should use the proper form of corporate
signature, this principle is often ignored. In Dalton v. George B. Hatley
Co. 79 the plaintiff corporation sought reimbursement for payments it had
made on two notes signed by the corporation's president as an accommo-
71. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10B (Vernon 1980).
72. The effective date of the statute was May 17, 1979. Id
73. 626 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd).
74. Id. at 802.
75. The precise question before the court was whether venue would lie against Trinity
under subsection 23 of the Texas venue statute. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(23)(Vernon 1964). To maintain venue under subsection 23, the plaintiff must plead and prove
his cause of action by competent evidence at the venue hearing. 626 S.W.2d at 799 (citing
Santleben v. Taylor-Evans Seed Co., 585 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1979, no writ); Pesek v. Murrel's Welding Works, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1977, writ dism'd w.o.j.)).
76. 626 S.W.2d at 800 (citing Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d
783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.)).
77. 626 S.W.2d at 800.
78. Id at 801 (Baskin, J., concurring) (distinguishing Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v.
Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.)).
Castilla also argued that Trinity should nevertheless be held liable to him as a matter of
policy for injuries resulting from a defective product manufactured by Custom, even though
Trinity was not involved in its manufacture, sale, or design, because Trinity, as a purchasing
corporation, was "better able to spread the loss of injury." Id at 801 (Baskin, J., concurring).
The majority did not address this issue, but the concurrence soundly rejected it, noting that
Texas public policy, as embodied in art. 5. 10B, was precisely the opposite of the policy urged
by Castilla. Id at 802 (Baskin, J., concurring). Given the legislature's swift response to the
decision imposing liability in Gerhardt, the concurrence is surely correct. See TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10 comment (Vernon 1980).
79. 634 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
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dation to the defendant.80 The president had signed the notes "George B.
Hatley." The court found no evidence on the face of the notes that the
president had signed the notes in his capacity as a corporate officer or
agent;81 he had designated neither his title nor the name of the corpora-
tion. Moreover, the court was unpersuaded that repayment of the delin-
quent notes with corporate funds was evidence that the president had
signed the notes in his representative capacity.82 The court therefore con-
cluded that the corporation could not recover as an accommodation maker
on the notes.83
As a general rule the business affairs of a corporation are under the
management of the board of directors,84 and corporate shareholders have
no authority to bind the corporation in its dealings with third parties.8 5 In
Rapp v. Felsenthal,8 6 however, the court held that a management contract
executed by the sole shareholder of the corporation in his own name was
binding on the corporation even though the execution of the contract was
not authorized at a formal meeting of the directors.8 7 The court reasoned
that a corporation may be bound by a contract in which all of its share-
holders join because the shareholders are the equitable owners of the cor-
poration's assets.88 Although the court recognized that the shareholder in
this case was also the corporation's president and one of its directors at the
time the contract was made,89 the rationale articulated by the court would
operate to bind the corporation even when the shareholders are not corpo-
rate officers or directors.
Although the actions of a board of directors ordinarily bind the corpora-
tion only if the board has been properly constituted, a court may disregard
irregularities in the election of a board member in order to prevent the
corporation from benefitting unjustly at the expense of a third party. In
Austin Lake Estates Recreation Club, Inc. v. Maberry9 ° a corporation sued
to cancel two promissory notes it had given to the defendant. The corpora-
tion contended that 'the board of directors that had authorized the execu-
80. An accommodation maker is "one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the
urpose of lending his name to another party on it." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
3.415(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
81. 634 S.W.2d at 378.
82. Id (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.403(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)).
83. 634 S.W.2d at 379, The court ruled, however, that the corporation could recover
from Dalton in its capacity as the transferee of the notes. Id (citing TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 3.201(a), 3.603(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)).
84. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.31(A) (Vernon 1980).
85. Itasca Roller Mill & Elevator Co. v. Wooten, 246 S.W. 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1922, no writ).
86. 628 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
87. Id at 260.
88. Id (citing Forrest v. Guardian Loan & Trustee Co., 230 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1950, no writ); Norris v. Cox, 131 S.W.2d 1028 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso
1939, writ dism'd judgmt. cor.); Boston & Tex. Corp. v. Guarantee Life Ins. Co., 233
S.W.1022 (Tex. Civ.-Galveston 1921, writ refd); United States & Mexican Trust Co. v.
Delaware W. Constr. Co., 112 S.W. 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ)).
89. 628 S.W.2d at 260.
90. 638 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
19831
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
tion of the notes was not properly constituted because one of the directors
had failed to meet the residence requirement imposed on directors by the
corporation's bylaws. The court concluded, however, that the director
could bind the corporation in this case because she qualified as a de facto
director.9' The court defined a de facto director as one who has been
elected to the office, but who has no legal title to it because of some infor-
mality or irregularity in the election. 92 The court recognized that a de
facto director can bind the corporation only with respect to third parties
who are unaware of the de facto director's true status.93 Because the direc-
tor in this case had been elected to the board and because the court found
that the defendant "could have believed" 94 the director was qualified, the
court upheld the validity of the promissory notes.95 In situations where the
de facto director doctrine is not available to remedy the defect in the com-
position of a corporation's board of directors, a corporation may, neverthe-
less, be bound by an earlier unauthorized act of its board of directors if a
properly constituted board later ratifies the act.96
Scope of Long-Arm Jurisdiction. A subject of continuing controversy in
the state and federal courts has been the reach of article 203 lb, the Texas
long-arm statute.97 Simply stated, the issue is whether jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants under article 2031 b is limited to suits arising out of
the defendant's activities in Texas, or extends as far as due process will
allow. 98 Last year, in Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc. ,99 the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that article 203 lb applies only to suits arising out of the defendant's
contacts with Texasl °° and requires a causal relationship or nexus between
the defendant's Texas contacts and the plaintiffs cause of action. 01 In
Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. ,102 however, a divided
Texas Supreme Court cast serious doubt on the Fifth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of article 2031 b. Hall strongly suggests that as long as the standards
of due process have been met, a nonresident defendant may be sued in
Texas on a claim that is unrelated to the defendant's activities in Texas.
In Hall defendant Helicol, a Colombian corporation, had engaged in
91. Id at 651.
92. Id. at 650 (citing Franco-Texas Land Co. v. Laigle, 59 Tex. 339, 344 (1883)).
93. Id (citing 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 385 (rev. 1982)).
94. 638 S.W.2d at 651.
95. Id
96. Greater Fort Worth & Tarrant County Community Action Agency v. Mims, 627
S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1982).
97. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982-1983).
98. The exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies due process if the
defendant has had "certain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
99. 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981).
100. Id. at 1265.
101. Id at 1267. Due process does not require a nexus. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-47 (1952).
102. 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1270, 75 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1983).
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extensive business activities in Texas, but these activities had no causal
connection with the plaintiffs' wrongful death action. The majority never-
theless held that jurisdiction over Helicol was proper. The majority did
not expressly address the question of whether article 2031b requires a
nexus. It stated that the only relevant question was whether the exercise of
jurisdiction over Helicol satisfied due process requirements. 0 3 The major-
ity observed that while a nexus might be required in cases where the de-
fendant maintained only a single contact or a few contacts with Texas, a
nexus is unnecessary when, as in Hall, the defendant's numerous contacts
with the state are such that the exercise of jurisdiction would be consistent
with due process.'10
The majority's failure to address specifically the statutory question is
surprising in light of Justice Pope's forceful dissent. Based on the statute's
language and its legislative history, Justice Pope persuasively argued that
article 2031b requires a nexus.'0 5 Had the majority intended to read the
nexus requirement out of the statute, one would have expected some ex-
plicit statement to that effect, or at least some discussion addressing the
arguments made by the dissent. Perhaps the majority considered the de-
fendant to have waived the statutory question, or perhaps the majority was
concerned that no other convenient forum was available to the plain-
tiffs. 0 6 After Hall it appears likely that nonresident corporate defendants
will be subject to suit in Texas on claims unrelated to their business activi-
ties in Texas, but a definitive answer must await future Texas Supreme
Court decisions concerning article 2031 b. 10 7 The Fifth Circuit, however,
has apparently abandoned its holding in Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc. 108 that
article 2031b requires a nexus and now purports to follow the Texas
Supreme Court's ruling in Hall that the exercise of jurisdiction under arti-
cle 2031 b extends to the limits permitted by the due process clause of the
103. 638 S.W.2d at 871.
104. Id at 872.
105. Id at 877-81 (Pope, J., dissenting).
106. If Mrs. Hall could not sue Helicol in a Texas court, she would have to go to Peru or
Colombia to press her claim. This prospect could not have been appealing to the majority.
See id at 873 (discussing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), in
which the United States Supreme Court considered the relative convenience of the forum
for the parties to the lawsuit).
107. The amenability of a nonresident corporate defendant to suit in Texas under art.
2031 b was subsequently at issue in Siskind v. Villa Foundation for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d
434 (Tex. 1982). In Sirkind the Texas Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether
art. 2031b requires a nexus because on the facts a nexus was clearly present. The supreme
court found that the plaintiffs allegations of misrepresentation and deceptive trade practices
arose out of the defendant's solicitation of business in Texas. Id at 436. Consequently, the
Siskind opinion sheds no light on the ultimate resolution of the statutory question. Thus,
after Hall and Siskind the reach of art. 203 1b remains uncertain.
For further discussion of Hall and art. 2031 b, see generally Weintraub, The Fifth Circuit
Wrestles with the Texas Long-Arm, 14 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (1983); Comment, Article 2031b
and Rule 108 After Hall v. Helicopteros: Another Proposal, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 497 (1982);
Note, The Expansion of Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Texas. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A., 36 Sw. L.J. 1197 (1983); Recent Developments, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 508
(1982).
108. 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981); see supra note 99-101 and accompanying text.
19831
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
United States Constitution. 0 9
In Jim Fox Enterprises, Inc. v. Air France,I 0 a diversity suit, a panel of
the Fifth Circuit ruled that Jim Fox Enterprises, Inc. (Fox) could acquire
jurisdiction over Air France, a foreign corporation, under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(d)(3)1 "' even though Fox could not obtain jurisdiction
over Air France under the state long-arm statute.112 It is widely recog-
nized, however, that rule 4(d)(3) does not provide an independent basis for
acquiring jurisdiction in a diversity suit over foreign corporations because
rule 4(d)(3) "deals with the manner of service and not the amenability of
the corporation to service of process."' '3 Thus, the court's interpretation
of rule 4(d)(3) in Jim Fox appears to be improper.
Venue. In Shell Oil Co. v. Sealy-Smith Foundation " 4 the court sustained
venue against a corporate defendant whose agent or representative rees-
tablished its presence in the county at the time .the corporation's plea of
privilege was heard, even though the agent was not present in the county
when the suit was filed. 5 The court distinguished several cases in which
the corporation's agent had permanently left the county before suit was
filed" 6 and analogized to a case sustaining venue against a corporation
operating a seasonal business that though closed at the time suit was filed,
had reopened before the court heard the plea of privilege." 7
III. SECURITIES REGULATION
Administrative Developments. The Securities and Exchange Commission
adopted a number of important rules during the survey period. Foremost
among these is the series of six rules (rules 501 to 506) collectively termed
109. Placid Invs. v. Girard Trust Bank, 689 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1982), vacating, 662 F.2d
1176 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit vacated its earlier decision on the basis of the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Hall. 689 F.2d at 1219.
110. 664 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1981).
111. Id at 65; see FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
112. 664 F.2d at 65. The court found that Fox's claim was unrelated to Air France's
activities in Texas, as required by Prejean, 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra notes
"99-101 and accompanying text. In light of the Fifth Circuit's subsequent decision in Placid
Invs. repudiating Prejean, see supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text, however, Fox
would have been able to obtain jurisdiction over Air France under art. 203 lb on these facts,
and rule 4(d)(3) would not have been in issue.
113. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1103, at 391
(1969); see Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); see also Wein-
traub, supra note 107 at 11 (rule 4(d)(3) applies only to federal service of process).
114. 624 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
115. Id. at 644. The court was construing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(27)
(Vernon 1964).
116. 624 S.W.2d at 646; see Childers v. Pumping Sys., Inc., 580 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, no writ); Vines v. Harry Newton, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ dism'd); City Drug Stores v. Hutson, 121 S.W.2d
428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, no writ); Ogburn-Dalchau Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 126
S.W. 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-1910, no writ).
117. 624 S.W.2d at 647; see Midlothian Oil & Gin Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co.,
120 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1938, no writ).
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regulation D." 8 Regulation D represents a significant attempt by the
Commission to integrate the various exemptions for limited offerings of
securities into a single regulation," 9 to expand the availability of the ex-
emptive provisions, and to coordinate federal and state securities laws.' 20
At the heart of regulation D is the concept of the accredited investor.' 2'
Derived from rule 242,'22 the term "accredited investor" has been ex-
panded in regulation D to include additional classes of institutional pur-
chasers 23 and individuals whose income or net worth is substantial. 24
Accredited investors are presumed to be capable of evaluating the risk of
investment. 125 Issuers claiming an exemption under regulation D may of-
fer or sell exempted securities to an unlimited number of accredited
investors. ' 26
Rules 504, 505, and 506 embody the substantive exemptions of regula-
tion D, replacing rules 240,127 242,128 and 146,129 respectively. Rule 504
exempts from federal registration the offering and sale of up to $500,000 of
securities within a twelve-month period 30 by an issuer that is neither a
reporting company nor an investment company. '3' An issuer may sell se-
118. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1982). For comment on and analysis of
regulation D, see generally Coles, Regulation D-New Rulesfor Raising Capital in Non-Pub-
lic Financings, 70 ILL. B.J. 612 (1982); Parnall, Kohl & Huff, Private and Limited Offerings
After a Decade of Experimentation: The Evolution of Regulation D, 12 N.M.L. REV. 633
(1982); Wertheimer, Small Offerings. Recent SEC and Legislative Incentives, 12 INST. ON
SEC. REG. 285 (1981); Note, Regulation D." Coherent Exemptionsfor Small Businesses Under
the SecuritiesAct of 1933, 24 WM. & MARY L. PEV. 121 (1982).
119. Regulation D is not, however, the exclusive exemption for limited offerings. See 15
U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (1976) (intrastate offerings); id. §77d(2) (private placements); id
§ 77d(6) (Supp. V 1981) (accredited investors); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (1982) (regulation
A).
120. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (Supp. V 1981) (evidencing congressional desire to de-
velop a uniform exemption for small issuers).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1982).
122. Id. § 230.242 (1982) (removed effective June 30, 1982). The term accredited inves-
tor was introduced into the Securities Act of 1933 in 1980 when subsections 2(15) and 4(6)
were added to the Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(15), 77d(6) (Supp. V 1981). The definition of
accredited investor in § 4(6) was drawn from rule 242.
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(3), (8) (1982).
124. Included are any individual whose net worth, or whose joint net worth with his
spouse, exceeds $1,000,000, id § 230.501(a)(6), and any individual who had an income in
excess of $200,000 in the preceding two years and who expects an income of more than
$200,000 in the current year. Id § 230.501(a)(7).
125. For that reason an issuer need not satisfy the rule 506 sophistication requirement
with respect to accredited investors. Id § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
126. Id § 230.501(e)(1)(iv).
127. Id § 230.240 (removed effective June 30, 1982).
128. Id. § 230.242 (removed effective June 30, 1982).
129. Id § 230.146 (removed effective June 30, 1982).
130. Id § 230.504(b)(2). In calculating the aggregate offering price, one must deduct the
ag~regate offering price of all securities sold during the preceding twelve-month period in
reliance on any exemption under § 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981), or in violation of§ 5(a) of the 1933 Act. Id § 77e(a) (1976). Thus,
the price of securities sold in reliance on rule 506 (or former rule 146), which was promul-
gated under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, id § 77d(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), need not be
deducted.
131. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a) (1982).
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curities exempted under rule 504 to an unlimited number of purchasers 32
and is under no requirement to disclose any specific information to
them.' 33 If securities are offered and sold pursuant to rule 504 exclusively
in states where they are registered pursuant to state law, and if each such
state requires the delivery of a disclosure document, 34 no restrictions exist
on advertising 35 or resale 36 of the securities.
Exemption under rule 505 is available to noninvestment company issu-
ers 137 for an offering or sale of up to $5,000,000 of securities during a given
twelve-month period. 38 Sales of securities under rule 505 are limited to
thirty-five purchasers plus an unlimited number of accredited investors.139
Rule 506 differs from rule 505 in two significant ways: first, there is no
limit on the amount of securities that may be offered or sold under rule
506;140 and second, rule 506 requires that an issuer reasonably believe that
every purchaser of the securities who is not an accredited investor is "capa-
ble of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment."' 14'
An issuer of securities sold under either rule 505 or rule 506 is required to
disclose certain information to all purchasers if any purchaser is not an
accredited investor,' 42 and cannot sell the securities by means of general
advertising or solicitation. 143 An issuer of securities claiming an exemption
under rule 504, rule 505, or rule 506 must periodically file a form D with
the SEC during the course of the offering.'" The resale of securities ex-
empted under rules 505 and 506 is restricted. 45
The Commission adopted a number of other rules and regulations that
deserve at least a brief mention in this survey. The Commission adopted a
new rule 12g- 1 providing that an issuer is not required to register securities
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934146 until the issuer
has at least 500 record holders of a class of equity securities and total assets
132. Unlike rules 505 and 506, rule 504 does not limit the number of purchasers. Com-
pare id § 230.504 (unlimited number of purchasers) with id § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (no more
than 35 unaccredited purchasers) and id § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (same).
133. Id § 230.502(b)(1)(i).
134. Id. § 230.504(b)(1). Texas blue sky law requires the delivery of a prospectus in
connection with the offering for sale of registered securities. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
581-9(C) (Vernon 1964).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1) (1982).
136. Id § 230.502(c)(2).
137. Id. s 230.505(a).
138. Id § 230.505(b)(2)(i). The method of calculating the aggregate price under rule 505
is similar to that used under rule 504. See supra note 130.
139. Id § 230.505(b)(2)(ii).
140. Id § 230.506.
141. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
142. Id. § 230.502(b)(1)(ii). The type of information that an issuer may be required to
provide will depend on the aggregate amount of the offering. See id § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A)-
(B).
143. Id. § 230.502(c).
i44. Id §§ 230.503, 239.500. Five copies of form D must be filed with the Commission
no later than 15 days after the first sale of securities, every 6 months after the first sale of
securities and no later than 30 days after the last sale of securities in an offering under
regulation D. Id
145. Id § 230.502(d).
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976).
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'of $3,000,000.147 The Commission also took several steps to integrate the
disclosure requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts:' 48 it consolidated the
disclosure requirements for registration statements and periodic reports to
be filed with the SEC under both Acts in regulation S-K;' 49 it adopted
three new forms (S-1, S-2 and S-3), two of which (S-2 and S-3) permit
certain information to be incorporated by reference into registration state-
ments; 150 and it promulgated rule 415, which provides for a delayed or
continuous offering and sale of securities over a two-year period ("shelf
registration"). 151
In response to the adoption of regulation D the Texas State Securities
Board adopted a number of amendments intended to bring the exemptive
provisions of Texas securities law in line with regulation D. Section
109.4152 was amended primarily to accommodate the concept of the ac-
credited investor embodied in regulation D. 53 Other amendments to sec-
tion 109.4 make the exemption unavailable to an issuer or registered dealer
who has had certain administrative, injunctive, or criminal sanctions im-
posed upon it. ' 54 The Securities Board also adopted new sets of rules es-
tablishing guidelines for registered public offerings of real estate 55 and oil
and gas programs.' 56 Both sets of rules are intended to make registration
of such programs in Texas uniform with those in a number of other states.
Texas Securities Act. The recurring problem of defining a security under
the Texas Securities Act (TSA) 157 arose during the survey period. In Ben-
Schoter v. State 158 the Beaumont court of appeals held that an assignment
of a producing, working interest in an oil well is a security within the
meaning of article 581--4(A) of the TSA.' 59 The court followed two
147. 47 Fed. Reg. 17,046 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1).
148. For a general discussion of integrated disclosure requirements, see Schneider, Inte-
grated and Rationalized Disclosure Act of 1967 is Finally Adopted by the SEC, 12 INST. ON
SEC. REG. 319 (1981); Note, Securities Regulation: Integration of Securities Offerings, 34
OKLA. L. REV. 864 (19F I).
149. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.802 (1982).
150. Id §§239.11-.13.
151. Id § 230.415. The effective date of rule 415 has been extended until Dec. 31, 1983.
See [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 83,250 (Sept. 2, 1982). For an excel-
lent discussion of shelf registration, see Ferrara & Sweeney, Shelf Registration Under SEC
Temporary Rule 415, 5 CORP. L. REV. 308 (1982); Gutfreund, The SEC's Rule 415, 121 TR.
& EST., Aug. 1982, at 11.
152. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.4 (1982).
153. The State Securities Board adopted verbatim the definition of accredited investor
from regulation D. Compare Tex. Sec. Bd., 7 Tex. Reg. 3777, 3779 (1982) (codified at 7 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 109.4(1 1)(G)) with 17 C.F.R. § 239.501(a) (1982). The Board made a
number of other changes in the rule to conform § 109.4 with regulation D. See Tex. Sec.
Bd., 7 Tex. Reg. 3777 (1982) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.4).
154. Tex. Sec. Bd., 7 Tex. Reg. 3779 (1982) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 10914(1 1)(B)).
155. Id at 3826 (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 117.1-.9).
156. Id at 3827 (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 121.1-.10).
157. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-1 to -39 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
158. 634 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont), modoied, 638 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982) (en banc).
159. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (Vernon 1964).
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Texas court of criminal appeals decisions 160 that the Texas Supreme Court
had cited favorably. 161
An investment contract meeting the test of SEC v. WJ Howey Co. 162
has been held to be a security under the TSA. 163 The Howey test requires
that there be an investment in a common enterprise with the expectation of
profit to be derived solely from the efforts of others.164 In Cross v. DFW
South Entry Partnershi 165 the issue was whether a purchase of land was
an investment contract under Howey. Based on representations made by
Charles Cross, Ronald G. Corley entered into a contract to purchase a
piece of land from the property's legal trustee, Bea Cross. Corley signed
the contract in his capacity as trustee for a general partnership that he
subsequently formed. The partnership agreement provided for the ap-
pointment of a manager. A corporation with which Charles Cross was
purportedly associated was named as manager by an endorsement on the
partnership agreement itself. The partnership agreement expressly re-
served to the partnership the right to terminate the management contract.
Alleging that the sale of the land constituted an investment contract, the
partnership sued the Crosses for failing to register the sale as a security in
violation of the TSA. Applying the Howey test the court of appeals held
for the Crosses. The court summarily disposed of the partnership's claim
against Bea Cross becuase it found no evidence that the partnership was
involved with her in a common scheme, or that the success of the enter-
prise depended solely upon her efforts. 166 The court engaged in a more
extensive analysis in assessing the claim against Charles Cross. Although
it was Charles Cross who had persuaded the partnership to purchase the
land, the court found that fact insufficient to involve Charles Cross and the
partnership in a common enterprise.167 Furthermore, the court found that
the partnership retained ultimate control over its investment and profits in
two ways: first, by reserving the right to terminate the management con-
tract, and second, by giving the manager a one-time fee rather than a share
of the profits. 168 Thus, the success of the enterprise could not be said to
depend solely on Charles Cross's efforts, even assuming he was associated
with the corporate manager. 69 Accordingly, the court held that the gen-
eral partnership had not purchased a security. 170
In a recent development related to the TSA a federal district court in
160. Muse v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 622, 132 S.W.2d 596, 597 (1939); Atwood v. State, 135
Tex. Crim. 543, 121 S.W.2d 353 (1938).
161. See Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940).
162. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
163. Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977).
164. 328 U.S. at 301.
165. 629 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
166. Id at 863-64.
167. Id at 864.
168. Id at 865. The court distinguished this case from Howey, in which the managerial
contract was irrevocable for ten years and the manager shared in the profits. Id at 864. See
also Williamson v. Tucker, 632 F.2d 579, 599 (5th Cir. 1980).
169. 629 S.W.2d at 865.
170. Id.
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Allais v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette17 1 held that a plaintiff could not
maintain a suit under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) 172
against a securities dealer for misrepresentations made in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security. 173 The court correctly reasoned that to
allow a plaintiff to bring suit against securities dealers under the DTPA,
which provides no good faith defense, would emasculate the due diligence
defense afforded securities dealers under the TSA and render dealers
strictly liable for their misrepresentations. 74 Reading the statutes in pari
materia, the court ruled that the TSA, which specifically pertains to mis-
representations in securities transactions, had to prevail over the more gen-
eral DTPA, 75 notwithstanding the saving of remedies clause in the
TSA. 17
6
Section 16(b) Liability. Although section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934177 requires a corporate insider 178 to disgorge the profits he
obtains from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the corpora-
tion's securities within a six-month period, not every purchase and sale, or
sale and purchase, within the statutory time period will result in the in-
sider's liability. In Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 179
the United States Supreme Court created a defense to section 16(b) liabil-
ity. Under Kern County the presumption of liability under section 16(b)
may be rebutted if (1) the transaction at issue is "unorthodox"'' 80 and (2) if
the particular circumstances of the transaction do not suggest the kind of
speculative abuse of inside information at which section 16(b) is aimed. ' 8'
In Pier 1 Imports of Georgia, Inc. v. Wilson '8 2 the defendant, Rayland
Wilson, successfully invoked the Kern County defense. Wilson was the
executive vice-president of Pirvest, Inc., 83 a retail operation. At the direc-
tive of Pirvest's president, Luther Henderson, Wilson sold all of his shares
171. 532 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
172. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.01-.63 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983).
173. 532 F. Supp. at 752. An earlier decision had held that a sale of securities was not a
sale of goods under the DTPA, Portland Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman
Gov't Sec., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ), but no
Texas Court had decided whether a stockbroker's advising a client constituted a rendering of
services under the DTPA. See Allais, 532 F. Supp. at 751.
174. 532 F. Supp. at 751-52. Similarly, the court concluded that a plaintiff would be able
to circumvent the scienter requirement, see Wood v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 643 F.2d 339,
345 (5th Cir. 1981), of the Texas general fraud statute, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 27.01 (Vernon 1968), if he could bring a suit against securities dealers under the DTPA.
532 F. Supp. at 752.
175. 532 F. Supp. at 752.
176. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33M (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
178. For the purpose of § 16, a corporate insider is a director or an officer of an issuer
corporation or a person who owns more than 10% of any class of any registered equity
security, other than an exempted security, of such corporation. Id § 78p(a).
179. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
180. Id at 593 (citing 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961)).
181. 411 U.S. at 600.
182. 529 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
183. Pirvest was a successor corporation to Pier 1 Imports of Georgia, Inc.
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of Pirvest, including shares that he had purchased within the preceding six
months, pursuant to a tender offer for Pirvest stock made by Pier 1 Acqui-
sition, Inc. Pier 1 Acquisition had negotiated the terms of the tender offer
exclusively with Henderson. Having successfully concluded its tender of-
fer, Pier 1 Acquisition exchanged the Pirvest shares that it had obtained for
substantially all of Pirvest's assets, whereupon Pirvest discontinued its re-
tail operations and became engaged in the business of trading in securities.
After the sale of Pirvest's assets to Pier 1 Acquisition, Henderson owned
eighty percent of the then-outstanding shares of Pirvest stock.
In a suit on Pirvest's behalf to recover the profits that Wilson had alleg-
edly obtained in violation of section 16(b), the federal district court ex-
amined Wilson's sale in light of Kern County. The court first held that the
transaction was unorthodox because Wilson had sold his shares pursuant
to a tender offer, and because Wilson would have owned stock in a com-
pany that was essentially a holding company controlled by Henderson had
Wilson not sold his shares.18 4 Turning to the second prong of the Kern
County test the court found that this specific transaction did not present
the opportunity for speculative abuse.185 Although Wilson's position as
executive vice-president raised an inference that he had access to inside
information, 186 this inference was effectively rebutted by stipulations that
Wilson had not participated in negotiations concerning the tender offer,
had no knowledge of the tender offer until it was made public, and had
otherwise been essentially excluded from the inner workings of the Pirvest
management. 87 Thus, the court held that since Wilson could not possibly
have abused his alleged insider position, he was not required to disgorge
the profits he had realized from the sale of his Pirvest stock. 188 As a practi-
cal matter the court observed that Pirvest's counsel had, in effect, conceded
away Pirvest's claim by stipulating to a number of facts that were determi-
native under the Kern County rationale.18 9
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. Although the United States Supreme Court
in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores190 expressly reserved the issue
of whether to infer a private right of action under section 17(a) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933,191 a Texas federal district court' 92 joined other district
184. Id at 243; see also SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (corpo-
rate reorganization is an unorthodox transaction under short-swing sale provisions of securi-
ties laws); Makofsky v. Ultra Dynamics Corp., 383 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (tender
offer is an unorthodox transaction under short-swing sale provisions of securities law).
185. 529 F. Supp. at 243.
186. Id. at 244 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 566
F.2d 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 1978)).
187. 529 F. Supp. at 244-45; see Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974).
188. 529 F. Supp. at 244.
189. Id. at 245.
190. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
1191. Id. at 752 n.15;see 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). See generally Scholl & Perkowski,An
Implied Right of Action Under Section 17(a): The Supreme Court Has Said "No," But Is
Anybody Listening?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 41 (1981).
192. Keys v. Wolfe, 540 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
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courts in the Fifth Circuit 93 in refusing to infer such a right. Given the
Supreme Court's reluctance in two recent cases to infer a private right of
action under other securities statutes,194 the district court surmised that the
Supreme Court would adopt the same posture with respect to section 17(a)
in the absence of any indication that Congress had intended to provide a
private cause of action under section 17(a). 195
Rule lob-5 and the Express Remedy Provisions of the Securities Acts. The
issue of whether an implied right of action is available under rule lOb-5' 96
when another section of the securities laws provides an express remedy for
the same proscribed conduct is a subject of continuing interest in the Fifth
Circuit. Last year in Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean 197 the Fifth Cir-
cuit considered the relationship between rule lOb-5 and the express reme-
dies provided by sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.' 98
This year, in Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc. ,199 the court con-
fronted the question of whether an implied remedy under rule 1Ob-5 is
available for damages resulting from a price manipulation scheme that is
encompassed by the express remedy of section 9 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.200
Chemetron Corporation had acquired stock in Western Equities, Inc.
(Westec) in exchange for Chemetron's interest in one of its subsidiaries.
After Westec failed Chemetron brought suit to recover the losses it suf-
fered as a consequence of the transaction. Chemetron alleged that the
defendant had engaged in a scheme to drive up the price of Westec stock,
and had either misrepresented the nature of the scheme, or failed to dis-
close material facts about the scheme to Chemetron in violation of section
9, section 10(b), and rule lOb-5. The jury found that the defendant en-
gaged in a manipulative stock scheme and that the defendant did not dis-
close the scheme to Chemetron, but it was not persuaded that the stock
scheme had affected the price that Chemetron paid for Westec stock, a
necessary element of a section 9 claim.20' Consequently, Chemetron could
not recover under section 9. Given the jury's other findings, however, the
trial court entered judgment in favor of Chemetron on its rule lOb-5 claim.
193. See Martin v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedricks, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. La.
1980); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
194. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (no pri-
vate right of action under § 206 of the Investment Adviser's Act of 1940); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979) (no private right of action under section 17(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
195. 540 F. Supp. at 1059-60.
196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
197. 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), mod#Fed, 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1982), a r'dinpart,
rev'd in part and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 683, 74 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1983).
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77/(2) (1976).
199. 682 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1982).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976).
201. Section 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides an express remedy for
any person who shall purchase or sell any security at a price which was affected by conduct
violating subsections (a), (b) or (c) of § 9. Id. § 78i(e).
1983]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
In order to determine whether a rule 1Ob-5 implied cause of action was
available, the Fifth Circuit followed the method of analysis it had previ-
ously adopted in Huddleston.202 Under the Huddleston approach a court
must ascertain whether rule 1Ob-5 requires the plaintiff to prove additional
facts not necessary for recovery under the express cause of action; if it
does, then a rule lOb-5 implied action is available.20 3
Comparing the elements of a rule 10b-5 claim with those of a claim
under section 9, the majority in Chemetron concluded that rule lOb-5 does
not require a plaintiff to prove facts beyond those required by the pertinent
subsections of section 9.204 Because rule lOb-5 imposes a lesser burden of
proof than does section 9, the court reasoned that permitting a plaintiff to
recover under rule lOb-5 would effectively nullify Congress's deliberate
and careful limitations on section 9's express statutory remedy.20 5 The
majority, therefore, reversed the judgment in favor of Chemetron on its
rule 10b-5 claim.2°6 A strongly-worded dissent objected to the idea that a
defendant who had been found to violate rule 1Ob-5 should escape liability
for his wrongdoing only because he had not violated section 9.20-7
Statute of Limitations in Section 10(b) Actions in Texas. Two years ago the
Fifth Circuit decided in Wood v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. 208 that the
two-year statute of limitations under the Texas general fraud statute, 20 9
rather than the three-year limitations period of the Texas blue sky law then
in effect, 210 was applicable to private actions in Texas brought under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.211 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the general fraud statute more closely resembled section
10(b) because both statutes required a plaintiff to prove reliance and scien-
ter, whereas the Texas Securities Act did not.212 This year, in Keys v.
Wolfe, 213 a federal district court reexamined the section 10(b) statute of
limitations question in light of the 1977 amendments to the Texas Securi-
ties Act, 214 which had not been considered in Wood. Because those
amendments did not affect the important considerations of reliance and
202. 682 F.2d at 1159; see Huddleston v. Herman & MacLeon, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir.
1981), modified, 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 103 S.
Ct. 683, 74 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1983).
203. 682 F.2d at 1160.
204. Id at 1162 (comparing rule lob-5 with subsection 9(a)(4)); id at 1165 (comparing
rule lob-5 with subsections 9(a)(1), (2) and (6)).
205. Id at 1163 (with respect to subsection 9(a)(4)); id at 1165 (with respect to subsec-
tions 9(a)(1), (2) and (6)).
206. Id. at 1170.
207. Id at 1195 (Williams, J., dissenting); see also Aldave, Neither Unusual Nor Unfortu-
nate.: The Overlap of Rule 10b-5 with the Express Liability Sections of the Securities Acts, 60
TEX. L. REV. 709, 738-39 (1982) (existence of express right of action under § 9 should not
bar implied right of action under rule 1Ob-5).
208. 643 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981).
209. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968).
210. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon 1964).
211. 643 F.2d at 342; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
212. 643 F.2d at 344-45.
213. 540 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
214. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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scienter, the court concluded that the two-year statute still applies to ac-
tions brought under section 10(b) in Texas.215
"Purchase or Sale" Under Section 10(b). The question of whether a repur-
chase transaction is a purchase or sale of a security within the meaning of
section 10(b) was before the Fifth Circuit for the first time in First National
Bank v. Estate ofRussell.216 Although the Fifth Circuit had previously
characterized a repurchase transaction in another context as "essentially a
short-term collateralized loan,"217 the court in Russell cautioned that that
description was not determinative for section 10(b) purposes. 21 8 Observing
that a fact finder could have found the repurchase transaction to be a
purchase or sale, the court held that summary judgment was improper,
without expressing an opinion on whether "as a matter of law, a repur-
chase transaction is a purchase or sale within the meaning of the 1934
Act."
2 19
Section 29(b) Right to Rescission. Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 renders voidable "[elvery contract made in violation of [the
1934 Act). . .and every contract. . . the performance of which involves
the violation of. . .any provision of [the 1934 Act]. .... "22o In Regional
Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co. 221 the Fifth Cir-
cuit canvassed a number of issues concerning this rarely litigated provi-
sion. The court first held that section 29(b) implies a private right of action
for rescission, 222 and outlined the necessary elements of a section 29(b)
cause of action: (1) the contract must involve a prohibited transaction;
(2) the person seeking rescission must be in contractual privity with the
defendant; and (3) the person seeking rescission must be in the "class of
persons the Act was designed to protect. '223 The court then determined
that all the traditional equitable defenses are available to a section 29(b)
cause of action.224 Finally, with regard to remedies, the court concluded
215. 540 F. Supp. at 1064. The statute of limitations for the Texas blue sky laws now
provides: "(2) No person may sue under Section 33A(2) [the antifraud section] ... (a) more
than three years after discovery of the untruth or omission, or after discovery should have
been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence; or (b) more than five years after the sale
. . TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33H (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
216. 657 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1981). A repurchase transaction involves a sale of securities
coupled with an agreement by the seller to repurchase securities of the same description at a
later date.
217. Westchester County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec. Corp., 648
F.2d 321, 324 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1980)).
218. 657 F.2d at 673 n.17.
219. Id at 676 n.24.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976).
221. 678 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1982).
222. Id at 558.
223. Id at 559 (citing Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357, 362
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968)). The court found that the class of persons the
Act was designed to protect should be broadly construed to extend beyond those who buy
securities. 678 F.2d at 561.
224. 678 F.2d at 562.
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that the policy underlying section 29(b) precluded a person who had vio-
lated the 1934 Act from collecting fees that had not been paid to him, but
did not bar his retaining fees he had received for services he had already
performed. 225
225. Id at 564.
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